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Motion to Terminate

Motion to Terminate

As the Attorney General has stated, and as provided in the INA and Regulations, “[i]mmigration judges . . . possess the authority to terminate removal proceedings where the charges of removability against a respondent have not been sustained.” See Matter of S-O-G- & F-D-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 462, 468 (A.G. 2018); see INA § 240(c)(1)(A).  The Immigration Judge “shall decide whether the alien is removable”); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.12(c) and may  “direct . . . the termination of the proceedings”). Termination is proper “‘when the DHS cannot sustain the charges [of removability] or in other specific circumstances consistent with the law and applicable regulations.’” See Matter of J-A-B- & I-J-V-A-, 27 I&N Dec. 168, 169 (BIA 2017) (quoting Matter of Sanchez-Herbert, 26 I&N Dec. 43, 45 (BIA 2012)) (alterations in original). Because the single charge of removability can no longer be sustained, this Court should terminate proceedings.

This honorable Court has the authority to terminate these removal proceedings over the objection of the Department of Homeland Security. The Attorney General expressly addressed this in Matter of Coronado Acevedo, explaining that the reason for the issuance of that decision was to ensure that Immigration Judges could use termination in situations, “where the pendency of removal proceedings causes adverse immigration consequences for a respondent who must travel abroad to obtain a visa; or where, as here, termination is necessary for the respondent to be eligible to seek immigration relief before USCIS.” See Matter of Coronado Acevedo, 28 I&N Dec. 648 at 651 (A.G. 2022)(emphasis added).  The Attorney General further states, “Pending the outcome of the rulemaking process, immigration judges and the Board should be permitted to consider and, where appropriate, grant termination in these types of limited circumstances.” Id. at 652. The decision addresses the exact circumstances present in this case and finds that termination in such a scenario is squarely within the Court’s authority.