In a Car
A Passenger in a Vehicle
Can a police officer order passengers in a vehicle to exit said vehicle during a traffic stop even if they do not have reasonable suspicion of a crime other than the reason for the initial traffic stop.
Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997)
No. 95-1268. Argued December 11, 1996-Decided February 19, 1997
After stopping a speeding car in which respondent Wilson was a passenger, a Maryland state trooper ordered Wilson out of the car upon noticing his apparent nervousness. When Wilson exited, a quantity of cocaine fell to the ground. He was arrested and charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. The Baltimore County Circuit Court granted his motion to suppress the evidence, deciding that the trooper's ordering him out of the car constituted an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed, holding that the rule of Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106, that an officer may as a matter of course order the driver of a lawfully stopped car to exit his vehicle, does not apply to passengers.
Held: An officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to get out of the car pending completion of the stop. Statements by the Court in Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1047-1048 (Mimms "held that police may order persons out of an automobile during a [traffic] stop" (emphasis added)), and by Justice Powell in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 155, n. 4 (Mimms held "that passengers ... have no Fourth Amendment right not to be ordered from their vehicle, once a proper stop is made" (emphasis added)), do not constitute binding precedent, since the former statement was dictum, and the latter was contained in a concurrence.
Nevertheless, the Mimms rule applies to passengers as well as to drivers. The Court therein explained that the touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is the reasonableness of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security, 434 U. S., at 108-109, and that reasonableness depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by officers, id., at 109. On the public interest side, the same weighty interest in officer safety is present regardless of whether the occupant of the stopped car is a driver, as in Mimms, see id., at 109-110, or a passenger, as here. Indeed, the danger to an officer from a traffic stop is likely to be greater when there are passengers in addition to the driver in the stopped car. On the personal liberty side, the case for passengers is stronger than that for the driver in the sense that there is probable cause to believe that the driver has committed a minor vehicular offense, see id., at 110, but there is no such reason to stop or detain.
Police May Order a Driver to Exit Their Vehicle During a Traffic Stop
Police Can Command a Person to Exit a Vehicle During a Traffic Stop
Police may order you to exit your vehicle during a traffic stop if it is for reasons of officer safety or to further their investigation. You must comply with their command for you to exit the vehicle. They do not need any additional probable cause or reasonable suspicion behind that which they had to legally pull you over. Failure to comply with that lawful order could be a crime and subject a person to arrest.
Police may NOT extend the stop any longer than is necessary for them to issue the traffic citation, the same as any other traffic stop.
SCOTUS CASES ON THIS ISSUE
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977)
Decided December 5, 1977
Syllabus
After police officers had stopped respondent's automobile for being operated with an expired license plate, one of the officers asked respondent to step out of the car and produce his license and registration. As respondent alighted, a large bulge under his jacket was noticed by the officer, who thereupon frisked him and found a loaded revolver. Respondent was then arrested and subsequently indicted for carrying a concealed weapon and unlicensed firearm. His motion to suppress the revolver was denied and after a trial, at which the revolver was introduced in evidence, he was convicted. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the revolver was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Held:
1. The order to get out of the car, issued after the respondent was lawfully detained, was reasonable, and thus permissible under the Fourth Amendment. The State's proffered justification for such order -- the officer's safety -- is both legitimate and weighty, and the intrusion into respondent's personal liberty occasioned by the order, being, at most, a mere inconvenience, cannot prevail when balanced against legitimate concerns for the officer's safety.
2. Under the standard announced in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 392 U. S. 21-22 -- whether
"the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was appropriate"
-- the officer was justified in making the search he did once the bulge in respondent's jacket was observed.
Certiorari granted; 471 Pa. 546, 370 A.2d 1157, reversed and remanded.
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, (1996)
- Citations: 517 U.S. 806, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 3720
- Full Case Name: WHREN Et Al. v. UNITED STATES
- Docket Number: 95-5841
- Judges: Scalia
- Other Dates: Argued April 17, 1996
Stating that the "[t]emporary detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the police, even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a `seizure' of `persons' within the meaning of [the Fourth Amendment]" and therefore must not be unreasonable
(this case's main legal finding is that "subjective intent alone does not make otherwise lawful conduct illegal or unconstitutional")